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feature between all of them being that they were
women and well-respected in their communities.
1.2 Extension workers
In 1983, the Ministry of Community Development
and Women's Affairs (MCD WA) carried out a
review of extension staff because there had been
complaints that, with independence, extension staff
from the many new central government ministries
were bringing different development messages to
villages. In particular, the Community
Development Workers (CDWs) and Home
Economics Demonstrators (HEDs) inherited from
the colonial Ministry of Internal Affairs were now
outnumbered by the health-based VHWs.
To address this problem, the MCDWA first devel-
oped a new concept under which communities
would be responsible for their own development
and only expect support from a single 'agent for
development', or Village Development Agent, who
would replace HEDs, CDWs, VHWs, and Farmer
Extension Agents from the Ministry of Agriculture.
This agent later came to be known as the Village
Community Worker (VCW).
1.3 Development Committees
In 1984-85, the government tried to reconcile
communities with state agencies by formulating
Village, Ward, District, and Provincial Development
Committees (VIDCO, WADCO, DDC and PDC).
The Ministry of Local Government took the leader-
ship in the formulation of a 'provincialisation' strat-
egy that became the 1985 Prime Minister's Directive
on Decentralisation. The state was still suspicious of
the chiefs and traditional leadership that had oper-
ated prior to independence, and power was consol-
idated around elected bodies (up to the district
level) and ward councillors, many drawn from lib-
eration war leadership. There had been an idea that
District Councils could elect Provincial Village
Assemblies, who would in turn elect a National
Village Assembly to ensure that national plans
reflected village-level concerns. These assemblies
were finally dropped in favour of a Provincial
Council, and it was further considered that parlia-
ment was adequate for national-level
representation.
The final assembly of structures to facilitate devel-
opment was adopted in 1985 at a series of meetings
22
where ministers presented to the nation how they
would promote development in the new environ-
ment created by the Directive on Decentralisation.
The outcome was a hierarchy of Democratic
Development Structures (DDS) mirrored by admin-
istrative structures (Figure 1). A number of directly-
elected DDS were given the mandate to spearhead
development, supported by indirectly-elected DDS
(usually made up of delegates from the directly
elected structures). The indirectly-elected DDS pro-
vided the coordination mechanism between popu-
lar bodies and central government structures set up
to coordinate development (at national, provincial,
district, and ward levels).
Below is a summary of strategies that were devel-
oped and implemented by the Nutrition and Water
Supply and Sanitation Programmes.
2 Programming Community
Mobilisation
2.1 Evolution
In 1986, the Integrated Rural Water Supply and
Sanitation Programme (IRWSSP) took the decen-
tralisation directive and gave it operational proce-
dures in the water programme (defining roles for
VIDCOs, WADCOs, district and other structures).
In 1986-87, the Supplementary Food Production
Programme (SFPP) completed and adopted its
intersectoral management strategies, again opera-
tionalising the Prime Minister's Directive on
Decentralïsation from village to national levels.
Both the water supply and sanitation programme,
and the nutrition programme, were managed by
intersectoral teams of technical persons: the
National Steering Committee (NSC), and the
Provincial and District Food and Nutrition
Management Teams (FNMTs). In both the SFPP and
IRWSS the lack of a national coordinator equiva-
lent to PDC was felt, and the National Action
Committee (NAC) and NSC played this role.
Provincial and district development sub-commit-
tees for IRWSS and the attachment of FNMTs to
these bodies were formalised. At the same time, vil-
lage and ward-level coordination strategies for
health activities were implemented in line with the
1985 Nyanga workshop recommendations.
Figure 1: Structures to promote development in Zimbabwe
In 1988-91, structures set up in health, nutrition,
and water supply and sanitation programmes
implemented community-based activities and
gained valuable experience. Lessons were learnt,
and in the case of nutrition, the SFPP became a
Community Food and Nutrition Programme
(CFNP) to reflect the success of the new manage-
ment system. In Mashonaland West Province, this
success was marked by the production of Kuguta
Kushanda guidelines for community projects.
Community mobilisation had been hindered by the
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rigidity of financial procedures issued by the
Ministry of Finance, and these were modified to suit
the needs of CFNP The gradual strengthening of
community mobilisation had thus continued
throughout the 1980s.
The turning point came in 1991 when government
started the implementation of an Economic
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and
Rural District Councils (RDCs) created by the 1988
Amalgamation of Rural and District Councils Act. lt
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Table 1: Operationalisation experiences in different phases of community-level developments
Phase
1. Needs identification
2, Planning
Coordination
Implementation
Advocacy
Monitoring and evaluation
Technical experts (consultants
and NGO stafi)
Weak and by technical
experts
Strongly influenced by com
mercial considerations
External agencies
External experts
can be argued that for community empowerment
and development, the structural changes brought
about by RDCs and ESAP lie at the heart of what is
going on within the development field in Zimbabwe
today Poverty and its consequences are more man-
ifest today than they have ever been in the lives of
most Zimbabweans, and the statecommunity part-
nership developed in the 1980s is under severe
strain.
2.2 Phases in community participation
The 1986 community participation strategy for
IRWSSP identified six phases for programme imple-
mentation using community mobilisation strate-
gies, and these in turn influenced the 1987 SFPP
guidelines (Table 1). The experience of both the
nutrition programme and the water supply and san-
itation programmes will be discussed in terms of
these phases.
(1) Needs identification
In 1980, only the NGOs could respond to the crisis
of hunger facing returning refugees in a situation
where neither the old nor the new bureaucracy
Involvement Participation
Consultants and government jointly by government
employees employees and individual
community leaders
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Government extension staff Indirectly elected DDS with
and some individual commu- inputs from technical experts
nity leaders
Government structures (dom- DDS and government struc-
mated by administration) tures (administration)
jointly by community leaders Pnmarily DDS and commu-
and government personnel nity groups
Extension staff Directly-elected DDS
External experts and local
administration
Participatory (with imple-
menters. extension staff and
external experts)
could act. By 1982, the newly established
Department of National Nutrition took over the
NGO-run child supplementary feeding programme,
because drought had placed demands on the pro-
gramme that were beyond the capacity of NGOs.
For needs identification, the programme relied on
structures developed during the liberation war in
the communal areas, and the main actors were indi-
vidual political leaders, some chiefs, NGOs, and
private citizens. After 1985, needs identification
became a joint responsibility of VHWs/VCWs,
clinic-based nurses, and VIDCO members. They
measured the mid-upper arm circumference for
under-fives, took their weight, and plotted these on
a master child-health card to determine vulnerable
communities. The Ministry of Labour and Social
Services was responsible for coordinating all
drought activities and used the administration arm
(Figure 1) to distribute fifteen kilograms of maize
per person per month in the rural areas under a
National Drought Relief Programme.
In the case of IRWSSP, needs identification was ini-
tially carried out by technical persons - usually
Empowerment
Community members and
their directly elected DDS
consultants working with government officials.
Communities complained that the siting of water
points was too much influenced by technical consid-
erations (ease of drilling, for instance) and not
enough by social needs (e.g. closeness to homes and
away from farming and grazing lands). After 1987,
needs identification became the responsibility of dis-
tnct councils through the councillor working with
members of WADCOs and VIDCOs (the DDS).
(2) Planning
Within community programmes, planning trans-
lates into prioritisation - making choices between
competing requests and needs. This function was
given to the indirectly-elected DDS where it was
possible for representatives of various bodies to
negotiate where water points, nutrition gardens,
and feeding points could be sited (with information
supplied by administration staff present at these
meetings). Sub-committees of the District Council
were in several instances able to work with repre-
sentatives from the District Development
Committees (DDCs) in allocating bore holes to
wards with high rates of diarrhoea, and gardening
plots to those with high rates of malnutrition.
For the DDS to make decisions, they used technical
guidelines from the nutrition programme which
would specify how much maize meal, beans, cook-
ing oil and salt were needed to feed a child per day,
and guided the distribution of food packs, food
preparation, and monitoring.
In the case of IRWSSP, there were guidelines on
household entitlements (cement, vent pipes, and fly
screens) for the building of toilets; and criteria for
giving one community a bore hole while another
got a deep well. Guidelines on this programme
failed to fully provide technical specifications for
effective use by the indirectly-elected DDS, which
became over-dependent on the administration for
implementation. There were nevertheless clear
guidelines on the composition and functions of
Water Point Committees (WPCs) (with majority
women members) and this contributed to the effec-
tive construction and maintenance of water points
under the programme.
The issue of water point maintenance was quite
critical, and the NAC borrowed the three-tier main-
tenance system developed in India. In this system,
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preventative maintenance work was done by mem-
bers of the WPC, the Environmental Health
Technician (EHT) would come from the ward for
more difficult work, and a district team would
undertake complex technical work. This system,
like the use of technical guidelines on construction,
proved too difficult for communities and their rep-
resentatives to implement, and various evaluations
indicate limited successes. Nevertheless, there is
evidence that many of the water points constructed
under this programme have been maintained, often
by use of DDF personnel, and WPCs have remained
active in the programme.
(3) Coordination
A 1984 evaluation of the Child Supplementary
Feeding Programme (CSFP) implemented during
the 1982-83 drought found that the main actors in
this programme were the Village Health Workers
supported by N GOs. The later definition of roles for
councillors, other ward-level extension staff, district
and provincial nursing officers, CSFP district super-
visors, provincial CSFP logistics officers, and
national level staff greatly improved the coordina-
tion of the CSFP during the drought of 1987 and
1992. Coordination was defined in the context of
NSC, FNMTS, WADCOs and VIDCOs. The main
problem identified was the lack of adequate trans-
port for supervision and poor communication
between villages and the higher levels. Coordinators
often used bicycles and buses, and this limited their
ability to visit many feeding points in a month.
The IRWSSP was coordinated by a number of agen-
cies depending on the complexity of the task (VIPs
and family shallow wells by MoH, deep wells by the
District Development Fund, and bore holes by the
water department). These agencies liaised with DDS
in ensuring that communities were able to work
together with government technical arms. While
coordination between government agencies and
NGOs was reported to be going quite well, there
were often major breakdowns ïn the coordination of
community inputs for the IRWSSP This programme
was well funded by donors, with sufficient vehicles
for supervision and technical expertise to monitor it
in the districts. The downside was the overall high
unit cost of putting up any of these water points,
due to the rather top-heavy central government-dri-
ven management system.
(4) Implementation
Once the nutrition status of children in a commu-
nity had been determined, government extension
staff, councillors and VCWs would operate the
feeding programme, working with an elected
Feeding Point Committee who would receive the
food, store it, distribute it, and organise a cooking
rosta so that children could be fed in groups at des-
ignated feeding points (e.g. someon&s home). In the
1987 drought, over half a million children were
given a supplementary meal a day, and this number
rose to over a million in the 1992 drought period
(in a country of less than ten million people).
The constitution and briefing of WPCs was similar
to that for the CSF except that the committee of
five had to have at least three women. FPCs were
always women, but men became involved when the
CSFP gave way to gardening plots and fowl runs
under the Supplemantary Food Protection
Programme (SFPP). The IRWSSP used the EHTs to
train builders for the programme and to distribute
materials for the VIP construction programme. The
dominance of mature women in these programmes
(and in the ranks of VCWs and Ward Community
Coordinators, who were formerly the CDWs) cre-
ated stability as men and young people tended to
move to urban areas in search of employment and
thus abandon community work.
The EHI was given the responsibility of promoting
shallow wells, while deep wells were made the
responsibility of staff from the District Development
Fund (DDF), which had the skills to use dynamite
to blast rocks. The DDF was also responsible for
organising the siting of wells and bore holes (using
community pre-siting meetings convened by coun-
cillors, VCWs and Ward Community
Coordinators). Due to the importance of water in
communities and the ability of this programme to
provide employment opportunities (especially to
village-level builders and well-diggers), IRWSSP
implementation was quite successful. There was
less success in accounting for the use of resources
following the breakdown of communications
between some departments at a specific level (e.g.
district) and between various levels (e.g. district,
province, and national). While a variety of agencies
were mobilised to participate in the IRWSSI keep-
ing them together and with equal commitment
proved quite difficult.
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Problems of implementation became obvious when
the IRWSSP was reviewed in terms of its original
targets (of water points and VIPs to be constructed).
lt had been planned that it would take three years
to provide each district with a VIP per two house-
holds and to meet the water point per population
targets given under 'planning' above. In many dis-
tricts, these targets had not been met after ten years
- even after adjusting for population growth.
There were a few attempts to improve on imple-
mentation by using the Land Use Planning (LUP)
component of the IRWSS where Agricultural
Extension Workers and personnel from the
Department of Physical Planning zoned village
lands in terms of their suitability for housing, graz-
ing, and cultivation, Initially, the programme had
relied on 'technical mobilisation', where the techni-
cal merits of the programme were explained to the
target population in the hope that communities
would move into villages and consolidate land for
production. When this phase did not lead to a
movement of people away from kraals to villages,
'persuasion through the carrot' was used - promis-
ing the target population services such as water
points, VIPs, schools, clinics, building materials,
and other inputs in the hope that they would move
into these villages. Although this second strategy
did not have much success, there was little of the
third strategy of 'implementation through the stick'
- where force is used to make the target population
comply, in the hope that they will soon see that
changes are for their own good. Only in a few areas
did some party stalwarts advocate for the third
strategy, but it was never considered an important
government policy (as happened in the Tanzanian
villagisation programme of the 1970s). Table 2 tries
to summarise the relationship between these three
strategies and the three phases of community
mobilisation.
Communities welcomed the LU but resisted vil-
lagisation because it would take them further away
from their agricultural land and the graves of their
ancestors. Some community members further
argued that it would create over-crowding and
therefore promote 'crime and other social ills' if
there was no happy compromise between 'the geo-
graphical/economic advantages of villagisation with
the social disadvantages associated with urbanisa-
tion'. In the end, the programme settled for a
Table 2: Relative importance of different strategies in community mobilisation
community participation strategy and this affected
the rate of implementation for activities under the
IRWSSP.
(5) Advocacy and training
The elaborate management systems and structures
for these programmes demanded that extensive
training programmes be developed and imple-
mented. This was relatively easy for the CSFP,
because it was in response to emergencies when lit-
tle other development work was being undertaken.
In the case of IRWSSP, it was more important to
integrate training activities into regular in-service
programmes for the various government depart-
ments (health, local government, community devel-
opment, agriculture, water resources, and the DDF)
and communities. NGOs were particularly involved
in training activities for both programmes, although
there was often implicit competition between cer-
tain government departments and these NGOs.
Health education in both programmes turned out to
be rather ad hoc and not as effective as had been
hoped by those who implemented the programmes.
On the positive side, there were many manuals and
guidelines produced, and these made it possible for
these programmes to have continuity, even in the
face of high staff turnover and time-breaks (espe-
cially for CSFP between drought periods), in the
implementation of these programmes.
The element of advocacy was very weak in both
programmes, with most of this taking the form of
posters and long reports that were not easy for com-
munities to access and use. National media rarely
reported on positive developments (except when
donors made contributions to the programmes or
when problems of transparency and inefficiency
arose). The need for a national communication
strategy had been recognised in the CSFP during
the 1992 drought, but government agencies proved
poor actors in this area.
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(6) Monitoring and evaluation
Monitoring was primarily left to local administra-
tion (Figure 1) and their reports were used to brief
the indirectly elected DDS. The directly elected
DDS were less well-informed because there were
few formal mechanisms established to facilitate
such briefings. Furthermore, the complexity of
these monitoring reports (especially in the case of
IRWSSP) meant that administration staff had to
make the presentations. Nevertheless, the national
goal to implement integrated programmes had
forced administration to provide information to the
DOS and to move beyond inter-ministerial projects
towards community-based programmes.
Evaluations were mainly undertaken with support
from the funding agencies, and it was then that crit-
ical lessons from these programmes were drawn.
Some of these lessons are discussed in the next
section.
3 Critical Issues and Lessons
Learnt
The lessons learnt are presented in terms of the
three phases of community mobilisation and
accountability: involvement, participation, and
empowerment. Community involvement is defined
as where external agencies primarily drive develop-
ment initiatives and invite communities to become
involved. The term communïty participation is
appropriate where external agencies seek a partner-
ship with communities, but retain control over
resources. By community empowerment, it is
understood that resources are controlled by com-
munities through their elected structures, and it is
these that define the terms under which external
agencies can become involved. In such an inversion
of the development triangle implied by empower-
ment, there is need for legally-binding distribution
of power between DDS and local administration
Technical mobilisation ++ +++
Persuasion through the carrot + +++ ++
Implementation through the stick +-s++ + +
Involvement Participation Empowerment
(be it representatives of central government or
employees of local authorities) for efficient pro-
gramme implementation.
In the CSFP and IRWSSI a clear definition of roles
between DDS (both directly and indirectly elected)
and the administration proved to be a precondition
for successful community-level accountability, as
this protected local autonomy and authority over
resources in programmes. In both programmes,
developments towards this goal facilitated the suc-
cessful implementation of activities, but fell short of
achieving sustainable accountability for these pro-
grammes to communities and their structures.
Accountability to communities was enhanced by
ensuring that there was information on the entitle-
ments and obligations of those communities within
a programme. This ensured that there were stan-
dards and measures for effective monitoring by
both communities and external agencies. In the
case of CSF communities had information on
what they were entitled to and what was expected
of them, which made it possible for this programme
to be quite dependent on community efforts. In the
case of water supply and sanitation, both available
technical information and distribution systems for
materials were too dependent on the administrative
structures and not sufficiently accessible to the DDS
and to communities.
The accountability of VCWs to the community was
reduced drastically when they became civil ser-
vants. The VHW had at least been accountable to
the district council, but the new VCW became
accountable to central government, a step that
reduced accountability and increased community
dependence on central government agencies.
There were several complaints among agencies pro-
moting nutrition and water supply and sanitation
projects that communities were often apathetic, and
traditional leadership often obstructive. In both
prOgrammes, there is a recognition now that tradi-
tidnal leadership and communities had been able to
assess the relevance of programmes to their needs
and enthusiastically supported those that suited
them. It is in this context that the traditional com-
munal granaries (zhunde) have received both com-
munity and traditional leadership support,
although they are considered 'conservative' by
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representatives of some government and non-gov-
ernment agencies. The attempt by government to
convert drought relief rations of maize into 'grain
loans' ran into problems of community repayments
once the drought was over - suggesting that the
graduation from stress-related interventions to
development programmes needs careful considera-
tion and extensive consultations with communities.
In the struggle over resources, Democratic
Development Structures were poorly equipped to
compete with local administration (which had a
streamlined hierarchy with access to national level
resources). It is the local administrative system that
exercised control over resource distribution and
accounting, although many efforts were made to try
and make communities responsible.
Under both community involvement and participa-
tion, a major problem was the lack of suitable
mechanisms to estimate and cost inputs by com-
munities. In the building of VIP toilets under the
IRWSSP, the cost of community inputs (even using
rural wage rates) was as high as 70% of the total
cost of building a toilet. The availability of this
information to communities and funding agencies
(including government) has the potential to trans-
form a project or programme from one of charity to
one of partnership.
Community participation has facilitated the incor-
poration of indigenous knowledge into these pro-
grammes. In the CSFP, traditional food preparation
and preservation methods were adopted and used
by feeding committees - e.g. the combination of
beans or groundnuts with maize to produce com-
posite flours. In the IRWSSP, VIPs were modified to
create two compartments to overcome the tradi-
tional difficulty of women using the same toilet with
the father-in-law; and traditional water storage sys-
tems (e.g. gourds) were modified and adopted.
The original goal of promoting mass participation
in development through VIDCOs was over-powered
by political party considerations as party cell and
branch leaders took over the leadership of VIDCOs
and WADCOs and effectively marginalised those
who were not members of the ruling party VIDCOs
became a mechanism for the ruling party to take
over development programmes in the village, rather
than mobilising whole communities (especially the
very poor, female-headed households and the
youth) for development activities.
The 1992 CSFP was later extended to schools so
that school children could be given a meal supple-
ment. The success of CSFP in times of drought led
some national and international agencies to imple-
ment a school feeding programme even in non-
drought years. The relatively less successful
non-drought CSFP points to the capacity of com-
munities and individual households to select what
suits them at a given time. A drought-related CSFP
is well supported because community members
have the time to participate since there is little other
economic activity, but not so successful in non-
drought years when households look to their own
efforts to meet food needs. Similarly activities
related to the IRWSSP are well supported during
the winter season, when there is little agricultural
work, but not in the rainy season, when families are
busy on the land. Expensive project redesigns
meant to overcome community resistance in these
situations are questionable.
Without devolution, it is difficult to sustain
accountability to community structures, and there
has been a steady 'taking back' of power over
resources by local administration in the highly cen-
tralised and deconcentrated governance system in
Zimbabwe. It is the need for accountability without
devolution in Zimbabwe that led to the design of
complex, cumbersome, and expensive structures to
promote and support community mobilisation in
both the CSFP and the IRWSSP to ensure that
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